


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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505



20 September 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel William B. Staples  
Executive Secretary  
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT: ACDA Publication "The Soviet Propaganda Campaign  
Against SDI"

Bill,

I am sending you this memo to close the loop. Recall that when you forwarded subject document for comment in late August, we talked about whether it was OBE or not. You advised comments were still wanted and I said they would be provided. You agreed to slip the deadline about a week.

I have learned that our comments were provided directly to your drafters by way of our Arms Control Staff. Sorry I couldn't get back to you sooner; it has taken me a while to sort this out.



Executive Secretary

STAT

Distribution:

Orig - Addressee

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(1) - ER



L-117

NSDD 172

## EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

## ROUTING SLIP

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SUSPENSE		COB 22 Aug. Date			

Remarks

Please have response prepared for my signature.

3637 (10-81)

Date  
19 Aug. 85

STAT

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Executive Registry

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY  
WASHINGTON

85- 3228

August 16, 1985

OFFICE OF  
THE DIRECTOR

## MEMORANDUM FOR :

William F. Martin  
Executive Secretary, National Security CouncilColonel David Brown  
Executive Secretary, Department of DefenseNicholas Platt  
Executive Secretary, Department of State Executive Secretary, Central Intelligence Agency

STAT

William LaSalle  
Chief, Executive Secretariat, United States Information AgencySUBJECT: ACDA Publication The Soviet Propaganda Campaign  
Against SDI

Attached is a draft of The Soviet Propaganda Campaign Against SDI, intended as a counterpart -- in style, format, and length -- to the ACDA October 1983 pamphlet The Soviet Propaganda Campaign Against NATO. Like that pamphlet, it has been written for public dissemination both in the US and abroad. Its contents are to be in full accordance with NSDD 172.

I would appreciate it if any comments you may have could be provided to me, 632-4766, by Friday, August 23, 1985.

William B. Staples  
Executive SecretaryAttachment:  
As stated.

UNCLASSIFIED when separated from attachment.

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ALC 00192

L-117

19 September 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR:

[redacted]  
Executive Secretary

25X1

FROM:

[redacted]  
Chief, Defensive Operations Branch, SOVA/SIG/SFD

25X1

SUBJECT:

ACDA Draft on Soviet Propaganda  
Campaign Against SDI [redacted]

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Attached is a copy of our comments on the unclassified ACDA draft. As I pointed out in the memorandum, our comments were coordinated with the NIO/SP. Please call me at [redacted] if you should have any comments or questions.

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Upon removal of attachment:  
This memorandum is Unclassified.

SECRET [redacted]

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6 September 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: [ ] (ACIS)

25X1

FROM: [ ]  
SOVA/SIG/SF/D

25X1

SUBJECT: The ACDA Draft on Soviet Propaganda Campaign Against SDI [ ]

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1. We have reviewed the ACDA draft and have found several security issues that trouble us. We also have included a number of text changes to deal with what we see to be substantive problems. These comments are divided into two sections with the first section containing changes that must be made. Those in the second section are recommendations only. The mandatory changes are designed to protect sources and, to a lesser degree, make the ACDA draft consistent with earlier unclassified USG papers on the same subject. In this regard, our review should not be considered to represent our endorsement of either the tone of the paper or its content. [ ]

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2. Our biggest security concern is the reference to [ ]

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[ ] it has not been included in other unclassified USG papers. Pages 13, 30, 31, and 33 have extensive discussions of material from [ ] You might want to bring these pages to Dick Kerr's attention as we did in our collective review of the recent unclassified DIA draft. Much of this material is the same as that used by DIA. [ ]

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### 3. Mandatory Changes

- Page 25. The language on the design purpose of the Krasnoyarsk radar is imprecise and should draw a clear distinction between battle management and early warning if the term "ABM support" is to remain in this report. This term has come to mean battle management and implies a direct connection between the radar network and the interceptor missile forces. We believe the radar was designed for early warning to enable the Soviet national command authority to characterize the nature of the attack and to initiate offensive and defensive plans accordingly. The draft

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could easily skirt this issue by pointing out that the radar is technically capable of battle management and by not talking about design intent. Either way the radar is still clearly a violation of the agreement.

- Page 26. We request that the word "hardened" be deleted from the discussion of leadership relocation facilities. [redacted]

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- Page 30. The following sentence should be added after the three ticks. "A laser weapon program of the magnitude of the Soviet effort would cost roughly \$1 billion per year in the US."

- Page 35. We would prefer that the chart be dropped unless it came from an earlier unclassified USG document

- Page 46. ICBM and SLBM production figures should be deleted unless they have been included in an earlier unclassified USG document. [redacted]

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- Page 48. Delete "at least" in front of "five new cruise missiles . . . ." We suggest in discussing the Bear H earlier in this paragraph that the draft speak of its "deployment" vice "production".

- Page 54. Delete "potential" in discussing throw-weight of Soviet ICBMs. Their advantage is well documented.

- Page 69. The 80 percent reference should be 70 percent to make it consistent with early unclassified USG documents.

- Page 71. The new Soviet Saturn-V counterpart should be called a heavy lift launcher as opposed to a medium lift launcher.

- Page 78. Add "detection and" between "missile" and "tracking" on the fifth line from the bottom.

#### 4. Recommendations

- Page 7-8. We do not believe there is a contradiction in Soviet propaganda statements on the SDI effort. Our interpretation of relevant Soviet statements is that the Soviets claim that the US

seeks a first strike capability, not that the SDI will be successful in giving us one.


- Pages 23, 43, and 62. We do not believe that the pace of the Soviet ABM program has increased since the signing of the ABM Treaty. It is true that they are now deploying a new system around Moscow, but it was in development in 1972 when the treaty was signed and the timing of this program would appear to be part of a normal progression in ABM development. Although it clearly continues at a sustained level, we are unable to point to any measures that would justify such a contention. The number of new system starts has not increased. In fact, during this period the Soviets apparently stopped development of one missile--the SH-4--and have proceeded at a fairly leisurely pace in modernizing their permitted Moscow defenses.
- Page 37. We recommend that the last full sentence end at "Soviet Union." Damage limiting is the mission of Soviet defensive forces, regardless of who strikes first. The author could add a sentence that this mission would appear to be more feasible if it were performed against the residual forces of a second US strike, assuming that Soviets struck first.
- Pages 41 and 43. It would be difficult to support the statements that the Soviets have caught up with or even passed the US in ABM technology. We assume this statement applies to traditional ABM developmental activity. We think the clearest Intelligence Community statement on this issue is in NIE 11-13. It states that, although such comparisons are difficult to make, the Soviets are today (1982) testing components based on technology tested in US systems in the early 1970s. Although this was written in 1982, we know of nothing that would change this judgment. In this regard, the US Homing Overlay Experiment would seem to suggest that the US maintains a lead in technology.
- Page 72. The statement that the "Soviets persist in the false claim that their space program is devoted entirely to scientific purposes" is not correct. The Soviets have admitted publicly--most recently in their own booklet on SDI--that they use space for such military purposes as reconnaissance, early warning, and communications. Their argument, one that fails to admit to the existence of the ASAT system, is that they are concerned about the weaponization of space.

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5. Our comments have been coordinated with NIO/SP.



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